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Abstract. This research project focuses on the impacts exerted by the
tech schemes behind virtual currencies on the EU framework to prevent
the misuse of the financial system and it aims to explore legal challenges
posed in the IoM landscape by the double-edged nature of DLTs as both
transparency and privacy-oriented. On the one hand, it plans to identify
effective legislative and regulatory measures to ensure crypto account-
ability from an AML/CFT standpoint, as well as to assess the relevant
role of pseudonymity. On the other hand, it pursues to discover inno-
vative legal approaches to secure AML/CFT active cooperation in the
crypto ecosystem(s), to the end of mitigating anonymity and traceability
concerns while respecting both the value of publicity and transparency
in the law and the conceptual origin of the crypto economy.
Keywords: Internet of Money · cryptocurrencies · DLT · blockchain ·
AML · CFT · pseudonymity · privacy · transparency · traceability.
1 State of the art
This research project is based on the following four preliminary pillars.
1.1 The crypto economy and the role of underlying technologies
To start with, it acknowledges transformations generated by the advent of the
so-called crypto economy to the global financial landscape, as the latter is con-
fronted with non-traditional forms of currencies in the wake of the Bitcoin launch
in January 2009 as well as with industry-altering ideas such as Initial Coin Of-
ferings (ICOs) or the recent Facebook-led Libra initiative. Conceptually, this
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disruptive monetary ecosystem gave birth to the notion of Internet of Money
(IoM) (Antonopoulos 2016, 2017b). It is profoundly influenced by inherent fea-
tures of Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) and, more specifically, of their
blockchain-powered subset.
In short, blockchain technology (BT) is a cryptography-based peer-to-peer
network system and it is the most common DLT scheme behind cryptocurrencies
(Antonopoulos 2017a). Its properties responded to socio-economic queries pur-
suing decentralized and disintermediated structures that allow seamless trans-
actions with no need of a trusted central party (Lischke and Fabian 2016), thus
devising the concept of “the Internet of Value (IoV)”.1 Unprecedented degrees
of verifiability, transparency, inalterability, trust and security stirred up interest
in the most diverse fields and the pivotal role of BT among DLTs was high-
lighted within the European Commission’s FinTech Action Plan (Arun, Cuomo,
and Gaur 2019; Bambara and Allen 2018; Hacker et al. 2019). Nonetheless,
projects such as IOTA wish to take these features to the next level by employing
blockchain-unrelated DLTs.2
1.2 Illicit use of cryptocurrencies and the race to legislative and
regulatory intervention
Secondly, though, cryptocurrencies and their anonymity-wise features were ex-
tensively argued to be vulnerable to large-scale exploitation for the most diverse
illicit purposes3 and to pose significant money laundering and terrorist financing
risks (Directive (EU) 2018/843; Europol 2019). Consequently, a growing num-
ber of regulation attempts have been made, against the backdrop of a broader
set of legislative actions targeting DLTs on the grounds that they often put the
logic behind existing legal regimes to the test (Hacker et al. 2019; Maupin 2017;
Paesano 2019). Essentially, the diversity of legal initiatives ranges from crypto-
specific legislation to interpretative instances of existing legal frameworks in
light of new technologies, thereby shifting between a pro-active and a reactive
approach to regulatory scrutiny and intervention (Maupin 2017; Paesano 2019).
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has been issuing international Anti-
Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CFT) guidelines
for virtual currencies (VCs) and assets (VAs) since 2014 and is currently working
towards strengthening the application of its Recommendations (FATF 2019b) to
DLTs. At the EU level, the 5th AML Directive (Directive (EU) 2018/843) targets
VCs by labeling fiat/crypto exchanges and wallet service providers as report-
ing entities, thereby making them subject to Know Your Customer (KYC) and
1. The IoV was argued to be the next generation of Internet compared with the
traditional Internet of Information (Chen et al. 2019).
2. More specifically, IOTA is designed for the Internet of Things (IoT) industry and
employs a type of DLT called Directed Acyclic Graph, the Tangle
3. Such as transactions on the dark web, online gambling or financing of criminal
and terrorist activities (Dion-Schwarz et al. 2019; Europol 2019)
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Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) obligations. Even within blockchain-
powered disintermediated ecosystems, the general tendency is to keep focusing
on gateways to/from the traditional regulated financial system (FATF 2019a).
1.3 Crypto traceability, pseudonymity and money laundering: a
multi-layered relationship
From a third standpoint, however, many actions were argued to insufficiently ac-
knowledge crypto technical aspects; critics challenged both pinpointed reporting
entities and the claimed level of anonymity and privacy. In spite of common mis-
conceptions, major VCs such as Bitcoin and Ethereum are pseudonymous rather
than anonymous and the same was suggested for Libra (Amsden et al. 2019; Lopp
2018; Wachsman 2019). Even if no real-world identities are involved, there are
ways to link public addresses to real identities (Al Jawaheri et al. 2019; Dupont
and Squicciarini 2015; Fleder, Kester, and Pillai 2015; Lischke and Fabian 2016);4
parallelly, blockchain analysis techniques were enhanced over time and allow for
a certain traceability of transaction flows (Airfoil 2019; Al Jawaheri et al. 2019;
Paesano 2019; The Cryptocurrency Consultant 2019). Besides, the address used,
the transferred amount and other metadata are permanently and publicly stored
on the ledger (Wachsman 2019).
Nevertheless, sharpened intelligence methods also spawned the development
of “privacy coins”, such as Monero and Zcash, whose goal is to provide complete
anonymity through privacy-enhancements such as embedded mixing/tumbling
services. The latter are offered by other platforms to users of less-anonymous
VCs, to obscure identifiability of tainted coins (Maupin 2017; Sun and Zhang Yi
2018a). Namely, the last topic highlights the two-fold relationship between cryp-
tocurrencies and ML: (a) “traditional” schemes perpetrated by resorting to VCs
in the placement, layering and integration stages of ML and (b) cryptocurrencies
laundering, i.e. tumbling ill-gotten VAs.5
1.4 The limits of conventional approaches to cryptocurrency
regulation
Sections 1-3 highlight how some blockchain features that are praised functionality-
wise give rise to thoroughly unpleasant scenarios. Concurrently, a massive ten-
sion can be detected between the need for financial transactions to comply with
originator/beneficiary information-related regulations and the nature of VCs as
a privacy-oriented instrument, which was imagined and created to keep inter-
mediaries out of the picture and seem to inherently challenge conventional legal
and accountability mechanisms. This friction emerges as of topical importance
4. As for Libra, the protocol does not link accounts to real-word identities; Calibra,
however, seemingly requires AML/KYC (Amsden et al. 2019; Lopp 2018).
5. In the last case illicit proceeds are VAs themselves. The FATF itself acknowledged
the entangling evolution of the VA sphere and the need for a common understanding
of the content of the relevant risk-based approach (RBA) (FATF 2019a).
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because next generation DLTs are foreseen to take the ongoing revolution be-
yond peer-to-peer computer networks up to potentially including every Internet
of Things (IoT)-connected device, while ever-evolving payment-related crypto-
graphic innovations keep defying legislative attempts (Maupin 2017).
On a parallel level the same tech design of VCs arguably mismatches tra-
ditional approaches to AML/CFT regulation of financial transactions and pay-
ment systems. Another array of reasons causes unsatisfactory legal results: (a)
distributed governance mechanisms of VCs and relevant accountability levels
vary significantly,6 (b) crypto transactions involve both traditional intermedi-
aries and other actors, (c) their lifecycle features a multi-layered stakeholder-
ship,7 (d) it is difficult to assess which innovative ecosystems properly belong to
the financial services sphere, (e) their cross-border nature and structures lead
to major jurisdictional issues. Hence, authorities such as the European Banking
Authority (EBA) put forward innovative approaches to the mitigation of crypto
risks, namely a private/public co-regulation regime grounded on “regulated self-
regulation”, which would be implemented through the so-called “regulation-
through-code” (EBA 2014; Hofert 2019). Besides, a “self-declaration” role of
VC users is being assessed at the EU level (Directive (EU) 2018/843).
2 Research questions
In light of all the above, this research aims to provide an answer to the following
main research questions:
1. Is any principle-wise aspect of the EU legal framework to prevent the misuse
of the financial system called into question by cryptocurrencies being inher-
ently influenced by the double-edged nature of DLTs as both transparency and
privacy-oriented?
2. Is there an effective level and type of legislative and regulatory intervention to
ensure crypto accountability from an Anti-Money Laundering standpoint, pos-
sibly leveraging on pseudonymity?
3. If not, what innovative legal approach(es) and concepts, such as regulation-
through-code, may secure AML/CFT active cooperation in the crypto landscape
and mitigate anonymity and traceability concerns while respecting the concep-
tual origin of crypto economy?
3 Description of the project
3.1 Setting a terminological and conceptual reference framework
The first part of this project is both technically and legally oriented and aims
at laying out conceptual and definitional backbones to the end of providing the
6. Namely between the poles of fully public distributed ledgers and private ledgers
(Hofert 2019).
7. Players involved, in fact, range from users to miners to exchanges to trading
platforms, wallet providers, coin investors and offerors (Houben and Snyers 2018).
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following sections with proper contextualization. It entails a preliminary analysis
of the system of principles and values governing the evolution of DLTs and their
payment-related implementations, in order to pursue other two specific goals: (a)
clearly defining the object and scope of this project and (b) reviewing several
features attached to these technologies in the context of the IoM, such as sector-
specific notions of transparency, privacy and publicity.
The goal sub (a) addresses the need for terminological clarity in legal re-
search and discourse, not to mention legislation and regulation, especially when
innovative frameworks are concerned. A proper investigation of the issue at hand
requires to go beyond the misleading interchangeability amongst concepts such as
“cryptocurrencies”, “VCs”, “VAs”, “blockchain”, “Bitcoin blockchain”, “DLTs”,
“non blockchain-based DLTs”, “stablecoins”, “altcoins”, “convertible and non-
convertible VCs”, “centralized vs. decentralized VCs”, “VASPs”. The preceding
labels are not just words, they shape the bottom line of relevant ecosystems and
stakeholders; referring to them inaccurately means misinterpreting their essence
as well as legal and accountability impacts. Initiatives such as Libra and IOTA
highlight the topicality of this preliminary issue.
As to the (b) section, reviewing the notions of “privacy” and “transparency”
in the realm of cryptocurrencies calls for re-tracing the socio-economic ideology
that spurred their advent, in order to assess (1) what “privacy” means for these
instruments, (2) its relationship with concepts such as secrecy, traceability and
pseudonymity, and (3) whether it is currently and prospectively inherent to VCs
(Sun and Zhang Yi 2018a).8 Different examples of the latter are scrutinized in
a case-study fashion, with reference to their technical aspects as they evolved
beyond shared traits such as distributed consensus, transaction transparency
and party entity abstraction.9 As for blockchain-based VCs, crypto-related “pri-
vacy” and “publicity” are confronted by breaking the issue down to pieces of
blockchain-embedded information as to determine whether they are private or
public; three aspects are relevant in this regard: a) privacy of identity or user-
identity privacy;10 b) privacy of transaction data/information;11 c) privacy of
8. Studies have tackled privacy impacts of Bitcoin implementations and under-
lined the difference between activity unlinkability and profile indistinguishability (An-
droulaki et al. 2013)
9. Distributed consensus means they feature no central point of failure or control.
Trans. transparency stems from ledger entries being retraceable and tamper-resistant
10. Privacy of identity relates to the concept of anonymity; it entails assessing the
link to a real-world identity, drawing a parallel between “public and private keys” of
Bitcoin-like virtual currencies and the concepts of “username and password” (Sun and
Zhang Yi 2018a)
11. Privacy of transaction data is a mutable concept; data is represented differently
in different blockchains, different aspects may be private from a third-party observer,
different types of information can be private to different extents. There is no binary
(public vs. anonymous) solution and there is a need for a flexible and structured ap-
proach to the “anonymity set” of different blockchains (Monero’s anonymity set is
arguably significantly larger than Bitcoin’s) (Sun and Zhang Yi 2018a)
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the total blockchain state.12 A parallel assessment shall be carried out for non-
blockchain-based cryptocurrencies.
3.2 Pseudonymity in cryptocurrencies between privacy
enhancement and blockchain intelligence
The second section builds on findings pertaining degrees of “privacy” and “trans-
parency” featured by the diverse array of cryptocurrencies, to the end of tack-
ling pseudonymity and transaction traceability in the IoM landscape. It fea-
tures a two-fold approach, as it focuses on (a) the multi-layered topic of in-
telligence strategies and (b) the concept of privacy-enhanced VCs and relevant
ever-evolving techniques. The end is to contextualize crypto pseudonymity by
determining whether (1) all types of cryptocurrencies are pseudonymous, (2) the
notion always holds the same meaning, and (3) there is a future for this concept.
Technical aspects13 that may exert influence in this realm are assessed, as well
as the role of forensics in ensuring accountability.
The part sub (a) focuses on blockchain and crypto-forensics and on relevant
achievable results against the backdrop of privacy-boosting strategies; it entails
references to the set of tools aimed at definitively or statistically matching actual
users to transactions performed by crypto-IDs and possibly spotting unique iden-
tifiers to individuals Airfoil 2019; Paesano 2019; The Cryptocurrency Consul-
tant 2019. Techniques such as transaction-graph analysis, user activities/address
clustering, clustering heuristics, transaction fingerprinting by leveraging publicly
available and off-network information, web-scraping and OSINT tools are taken
into account.14 Reference is not limited to Bitcoin forensics; data-exploitation
strategies were deployed also on the Ethereum blockchain and discussions are
ongoing for non BT-based DLTs.15
The topic sub (b) targets anonymity-enhanced VCs and takes a case-study
and AML-oriented approach, leveraging on experiences such as Monero and
Zcash.16 It is grounded on three methods that have been identified to obfus-
12. It was argued that different attributes of the total blockchain state can be private
to different extents (Sun and Zhang Yi 2018a)
13. Such as blockchain internal governance and types of consensus algorithm
14. On transaction-graph analysis:(Fleder, Kester, and Pillai 2015; Ober, Katzen-
beisser, and Hamacher 2013); On user activities clustering:(Neudecker and Harten-
stein 2017); On clustering heuristics (Androulaki et al. 2013; Lischke and Fabian 2016;
Reid and Harrigan 2013); On transaction fingerprinting using p.a. information:(Fleder,
Kester, and Pillai 2015); On using off-network information:(Lischke and Fabian 2016;
Reid and Harrigan 2013); On web-scraping and OSINT tools:(Airfoil 2019).
15. Notably to detect smart Ponzi schemes on Ethereum (Chen et al. 2019); as for
IOTA: (Tennant 2017).
16. Unlike the Bitcoin blockchain, “privacy coins” do not keep unencrypted records
of data such as wallet addresses and transactions amounts. Zcash reaches a high degree
of privacy by making use of “zero-knowledge proofs”, whereas Monero is slightly less
anonymous but implements more intensively tested techniques of ring signatures. Zcash
offers selective transparency of transactions and it originally defined itself as “Bitcoin
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cate financial flows: (x) mixing-/tumbling-based approaches; (y) zero-knowledge
based privacy; (z) user best practices (Sun and Zhang Yi 2018b, 2018a; Zhang
and Sun 2019).17 Within the (b) issue, and ultimately going beyond it, a subsec-
tion is dedicated to currency mixing/tumbling in the crypto world, in view of its
pivotal role in the ML/TF landscape.18 Bitcoin mixing services originated the
notion of cryptocurrency laundering (Airfoil 2019). Some “privacy coins” embed
this system, but it is also possible to convert Bitcoins into less trackable VCs via
crypto-to-crypto mixers after obtaining them via a regulated fiat-to-crypto ex-
change; this is the reason why recent years have seen the rise of virtual-to-virtual
layering schemes (FATF 2019a, 2019c).
3.3 Legislative and regulatory approaches to cryptocurrencies
within an “active cooperation”-based AML/CFT framework
From a third point of view, this project focuses on the observed legal and regu-
latory impacts exerted by VCs on the EU financial ecosystem, and most notably
on the AML/CFT framework. This part is divided into three subsections and
assesses: (a) relevant AML/CFT initiatives targeting cryptocurrencies and VAs,
(b) perceived peculiarities of VCs from an AML/CFT risk perspective and (c)
specificities related to the feasibility of crypto-related “obliged entities” and rel-
evant advantages and disadvantages.
The topic sub (a) is tackled by addressing most relevant principles, con-
cepts, actors and obligations in this realm. Hence, this first subsection entails
reference to preventive measures such as Customer Due Diligence (CDD), KYC,
recordkeeping, STR, internal controls, as well as sanctions, enforcement, licens-
ing and/or registration of gatekeeper-like entities. Also in the crypto context,
CDD requires to identify (and verify the identity of) transaction counterparties,
such as customers and beneficial owners, and to assess purpose and intended
nature of the business relationship (Paesano 2019).19 The analysis starts out
from international guidelines and delves into the legislative approach taken at
the EU level, as enshrined by the 5th AML Directive, and into elements arisen
from transposition procedures brought about by Member States and relevant
enforcement data. Yet, the scope of the comparative analysis may encompass
is like HTTP for money, Zcash is HTTPS”. DASH might also be arguably labelled
as a “privacy coin”. The possibility of enhancing IOTA’s privacy protocols despite
its quantum resilient hash-based signatures is under assessment (Sarfraz et al. 2019;
Tennant 2017).
17. The latter entails the use of anonymizers such as The Onion Router (TOR),
Invisible Internet Protocol (I2P) or Dark Wallet to hide the origin of the transaction
or employing a new address for every payment (Sun and Zhang Yi 2018a).
18. The concept leverages on the fungibility of cryptocurrencies and consists of com-
bining inputs and outputs of different transactions into a larger one, in order to sever
the links between addresses of senders and recipients (Sun and Zhang Yi 2018a).
19. Tracing the IP address may be demanded when Enhanced CDD is required (FATF
2019a).
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non-EU jurisdictions whose experiences may provide useful insights to the goal
of this research.
Subsection (b) wishes to identify the main risks posed by VCs in the area
of ML and financing of criminal activities, as well as to determine which imple-
mentations are more dangerous from a concrete perspective. It accounts for the
distinction between centralized and decentralized VAs-related services. The ap-
proach is strengthened by analyzing the difference between cryptocurrencies and
other means that can be used to engage in non-face-to-face business relationships
and to rapidly move funds globally, against the backdrop of the evolving land-
scape of digital payments; a data-based approach may highlight whether and
how crypto-transactions are actually more dangerous than the ones performed
using regular fiat money. Reference is based on the abovementioned multi-layered
relationship between VCs and the concept of ML.
The analysis sub (c) builds on the acknowledgement that while the AML/CFT
framework relies on the active cooperation of the so-called “obliged entities”, the
IoM is developing beyond gateways and gatekeepers and transfers do not always
involve regulated third parties or beneficiaries, as well as that recent regulatory
efforts have targeted not only VAs that are convertible to fiat money but also
VAs that are convertible to another VA (FATF 2019a; Paesano 2019). The actual
role and accountability attached to entities included in the scope of the 5th AML
Directive, as well as the effectiveness of this choice, need further scrutiny.20
3.4 The IoM between anonymity and publicity: legal and
AML/CFT impacts of the double-edged nature of DLTs
The fourth part strives to integrate previous results and to (a) assess whether
the double-edged nature of DLTs as both transparency and privacy-oriented may
be reconciled to allow for crypto payments to comply with state-of-the-art prin-
ciples informing legislation targeting financial transactions, and (b) understand
whether it is possible to determine a suitable level of legislative intervention to
mitigate secrecy-related concerns while enabling crypto-specific socio-economical
and cross-border financial goals.
This section plans to honor the need for legislative actions to focus on in-
dividual cases rather than merely being technology-based; due to the diversity
of DLT-based or even blockchain-based utilities, in fact, it was noted that legal
efforts ought to be grounded on the concrete function of each specific tool. More
specifically, scholars have identified three categories blockchain-based implemen-
tations may belong to with respect to their legal impacts: a) recycle box; b) dark
box; c) sandbox (Maupin 2017). The first set of instruments are usually imple-
mented by AML/CFT-regulated actors and are overall compatible with existing
legal frameworks, hence requiring only minor adaptations;21 at the opposite side,
20. It is also interesting to resort to blockchain analytic service providers to validate
source of wealth and obtain a risk rating for Enhanced CDD (Paesano 2019).
21. For instance, blockchain-based interbank settlement systems such as the Ripple
network and the so-called “blockchain banking” (Maupin 2017).
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the dark box category features use cases whose objectives are fundamentally il-
legal. In between, a set of transformative innovations defy existing legal schemes
because compliance would destroy the specific implementation; their objective
is not illegal, but they involve risks that ought to be regulated.22
The goal is to understand whether the current EU AML/CFT framework
is inherently compatible with changes set forth by the advent of blockchain-
based payment and its most recent transparency- and privacy-wise evolutions,
which leads to topic sub (b). The comprehensive or piecemeal outlawing option
is taken into account, as well as critics underlining that the only way to perform
it would be to shut down the Internet altogether. Parallelly, it is to be noted
that (1) the FATF has called for participating jurisdictions to forbid VASPs from
engaging in activities that involve anonymity-enhancing technologies if unable
to manage and mitigate relevant risks, as well as (2) scholars and authorities
have started discussing the actual feasibility of forcing the crypto-world into the
abovementioned system of “approved parties” (FATF 2019a; Paesano 2019).
3.5 Bridging the gaps between law as-we-know-it and the
crypto ecosystem: innovative legal approaches and
regulation-through-code
The final section of this research projects aims to (a) come to terms with those
specificities of cryptocurrencies that may clash with existing legislative, regula-
tory and supervisory schemes and, most importantly, concepts, in order to (b)
understand what fences innovative AML/CFT solutions ought to mend and (c)
put forward possible ideas from an evolutionary perspective. Preceding sections
are bound to highlight topical issues to be borne in mind, as well as suggest ele-
ments to shape an innovative and efficient solution or part thereof. The bedrock
of this reasoning is that assessed tools belong to the cyberspace landscape, which
was argued to be a realm where code complements or even substitutes law from
a normative order standpoint (Hacker et al. 2019).
Consistently, the topic sub (b) elaborates on technical features of stakehold-
ers and actors involved in crypto transactions and is coupled with an analysis
of the underlying ratio of the abovementioned idea of creating a “scheme gover-
nance authority” that would ensure accountability to regulators and supervisors
and whose setup would be mandatory for VC schemes wishing to be regulated as
a financial service and interact with regulated financial services. As compliance
with such a requirement could challenge the very same existence and conceptual
origin of VCs and runs the risk of destroying the whole structure, compatibility
needs to be assessed. This is why in order to tackle subsection (c) a parallel
aspect will be taken into consideration, consistently with findings of the preced-
ing steps of this research, namely the role of cryptocurrency users and market
participants in complying with AML/CFT obligations, mitigating relevant risks
22. for instance because they bypass regulated entities, such as in the DAO case.
(Maupin 2017).
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and establishing themselves as governance authorities (EBA 2014; Houben and
Snyers 2018; Hofert 2019).
4 Methodological remarks
The abovementioned subsections feature different, albeit ultimately convergent,
methodological approaches. The main reason lies in the concurrent presence of
legal, technical and socio-economic aspects, which need to be scrutinized in a way
that both reflects their specificities and is consistent with the overall structure
of this project and its intended innovation-oriented objectives. Hence, relevant
methodologies are foreseen to range from deductive, to inductive, to abductive
and speculative reasonings. Multiple approaches will not cause inconsistencies,
as reasons will be clarified, and each specific finding contextualized.
Consistently, parts that are legally oriented from a state-of-the-art perspec-
tive are based on a comparative documentary analysis of systems of values and
concepts as primarily enshrined by EU legal sources and policy instruments, in
conjunction with international guidelines and MS-level transposition and imple-
mentation of legal, regulatory and operational measures. They mainly feature
a deductive approach. Sections wishing to go beyond established approaches by
conceptualizing findings draw from a deductive approach but are grounded on
inductive and speculative reasoning from both a normative and a non-normative
perspective; inherently, they are also bound to take an evaluative stand. The em-
ployment of abductive reasoning cannot be ruled out, as a pragmatical stand-
point is foreseen as pivotal in tackling the complexities of the issues at hand.
All sections deal or are somehow confronted with technical aspects of infor-
mation technology, albeit are still placed within the setting of legal arguments.
Consequently, they draw from both doctrinal and empirical analyses; they will
involve documentary research based on legal and technical sources, and they
will feature an inductive approach to impacts on principles and systems of val-
ues. Meanwhile, insofar as they also focus on the perspective of relevant crypto
stakeholders and socio-legal aspects, they may also infer from field research and
interviews. Inherently technical parts will also feature a descriptive approach,
built on the abovementioned documentary analyses which will be enhanced by
the participation in conferences, events, secondments and trainings.
5 Expected results
This research is bound to identify friction points between transformations brought
about by DLT-based tools, notably blockchain-based, and traditional principles
underlying legislative approaches to financial transactions. The extent to which
these changes diverge from those generated by other instances of digitalization
and the globalization process should be further investigated, as well as impacts
on the system of values informing the EU AML/CTF landscape. Arguably, the
feasibility of anonymity-enhanced ecosystems complying with state-of-the-art
regulations appears as rather weak. Recent FATF guidelines on how to apply
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relevant Recommendations may be referred to as a prime example of this. At the
same time, inherent features of the IoM seem to mismatch legal objectives aim-
ing at anticipating changes in criminal activities (Europol 2019), giving rise to
major controversies. It was argued that AML/KYC requirements could go to the
detriment of opportunities offered to the unbanked or non-traditional investors
(Wachsman 2019).
The analysis is definitively aiming at a moving target, which causes the
risk of overfitting, as the actual risk behind cryptocurrencies largely relies on
the relevant use by criminals, which in turns depends on anonymity features,
blockchain-embedded privacy, regulation and law enforcement (Paesano 2019).23
The proposed study does not take for granted that disruptive technology equals
disrupted law (Fradera 2018). Nevertheless, a feature of BTs is to implement
tasks traditionally performed by law and legal institutions (Mo¨slein 2018), as
well as to carry an alternative vision of the economic system (Hacker et al. 2019),
which gives rise to foresee principle-wise alterations grounded on the transposi-
tion of interactions pertaining to a specific social and economic environment to
a virtual, potentially horizontally-structured and hyper-connected world. Sim-
ilarly, the inherent structure of these tech solutions seemingly leads to a deep
power shift amongst stakeholders, possibly giving rise to a so-called “emergent
technocracy” (Hacker et al. 2019).
This proposal plans to reach an assessment of the scope of possible innovation-
suited reforms, built on cross-jurisdictional cooperation via an integrated ap-
proach and possibly on the concepts of regulation by design and regulation-
through-code (EBA 2014; Hofert 2019). As the financial sector has arguably
been the first area of systematic application of BTs (Hacker et al. 2019), fo-
cusing on the anonymity and publicity aspects of the IoM and cryptocurrencies
may provide impactful legislative and regulatory insights also with reference
to the so-called “Blockchain 2.0” implementations such as smart contracts and
blockchain-based organizations.
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